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Government Reinsurance Programs and
Consumer-Driven Care
JOHN V. JACOBIt
INTRODUCTION
Creating sound and equitable health coverage is a goal
that has bedeviled Americans for decades. We spend more
than any other nation on health, but provide strikingly
uneven coverage for tens of millions. People without
adequate insurance live shorter and sicker lives. Providers,
particularly those in the "safety net" such as public and
nonprofit hospitals in poor neighborhoods, strain to
maintain services in communities that are home to a high
percentage of uninsured and underinsured residents.
Proposals for significant reform were few in the years
following the failure of the Clinton reform proposal, but in
recent years proposals for reform ranging from adoption of
universal coverage models to more targeted incremental
measures have been advanced. These proposals are
disparate, and some challenge our historic notions of health
insurance and the role of government in health finance.
Part I of this article will describe two of the casualties
of our decades-long failure to create a secure system of
national health coverage: uninsured and underinsured
people, and safety net providers that are often left to plug
the gaps left by our public policy irresponsibility. Part II
will describe the renewed interest in systemic reform, and
focus on two proposals: the "ownership society" inspired
attempts to devolve responsibility and control over much
health spending to consumers and the movement to reduce
the risk premium (and thereby the price) of private
coverage through government reinsurance. It will also
argue that these methods are unlikely to cure the illnesses
t Professor and Associate Director, Seton Hall Law School Health Law & Policy
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they were designed to address. Part III will suggest a
synthesis of these two reform proposals, taking the good
from both, and consider how this synthesis responds to the
needs of consumers and safety net providers.
The proposal credits a central insight of the consumer
driven health care movement. American health insurance
serves several functions, one of which is the catastrophic
coverage protecting people who experience very high costs
from impaired access to care and from personal bankruptcy.
Although few people experience these very high costs, those
that do need expensive acute or chronic care account for a
high percentage of health costs. It is a central insight of the
consumer driven health care movement that pieces of
health insurance can be addressed separately, and in
particular, that the catastrophic coverage can be provided
by one entity, while the more routine and preventive
services can be covered by another. The proposal also
credits an insight derived from reinsurance programs active
in several states. Through these reinsurance programs,
states assume the risk for much of the very high costs of
those few members of private insurance pools whose care
exceeds a set threshold. In this way, states are able to
lessen insurers' incentives to deny coverage to risky
persons, and to lessen the "risk premium" that adds to the
cost of small group and individual coverage.
Combining these two insights, this article proposes a
program by which government assumes a substantial
portion of the catastrophic costs of private coverage through
broad reinsurance programs. This method of shoring up
private coverage both recognizes the social responsibility for
truly catastrophic health expenses, while permitting the
continuation of politically popular and personally
comfortable relationships of coverage in the private sector.
The reinsurance program would increase government
responsibility for the aspects of health care most clearly
beyond individuals' control and therefore most clearly
within the realm of broad societal responsibility without
embarking on a new or expanded venture by government
into direct coverage of the population historically served by
private sector coverage.
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I. Two VICTIMS OF AMERICA'S FAILING HEALTH INSURANCE
SYSTEM.
The un-insurance figures in America, though familiar,
are truly shocking. A recent survey found that almost 44
million were uninsured for an entire year, and over 53
million were uninsured for at least six months during 2002
and 2003,1 and that number has been growing.2 Institutions
that provide care for the uninsured and underinsured are
"safety net" institutions-those that provide "health care
and other health-related services to the uninsured,
Medicaid [recipients], and other vulnerable patients. ' 3
Increasing numbers of those uninsured and reduced
support from strained Medicaid programs and other sources
of public funding have presented significant challenges to
these essential providers. 4 This Part reviews the effects of
the deterioration of the American health finance system on
these two groups.
A. The Uninsured
American health insurance is in transition. It has been
a private, largely employer-based system with public
supplements. In recent years, however, two evolutionary
changes have come to the fore. First, the public component
of the system has become more substantial. Medicare's
percentage of coverage grows with the aging of the
1. Families USA Foundation, One in Three: Non-Elderly Americans Without
Health Insurance, 2002-2003, at 3 (June 2004).
2. See Sherry A. Glied & Phyllis C. Borzi, The Current State of
Employment-Based Health Coverage, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 404, 405 (2004);
Catherine Hoffman et al., Holes In The Health Insurance System - Who Lacks
Coverage And Why, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 390, 390-91 (2004); David Leonhardt,
More Americans Were Uninsured and Poor in 2003, Census Finds, N.Y.TIMES,
Aug. 27, 2004, at Al.
3. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, AMERICA'S HEALTH CARE SAFETY NET: INTACT BUT
ENDANGERED 21 (Marion Ein Lewin & Stuart Altman eds., 2000), available at
http://www.nap.edu/books/030906497X/html (last visited May 19, 2005).
4. See Bruce Siegel et al., Health Reform and the Safety Net: Big
Opportunities; Major Risks, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 426, 427-28 (2004); Ingrid
Singer et al., America's Safety Net Hospitals and Health Systems, 2002: Results
of the 2002 Annual NAPH Member Survey (Sept. 2004), at
http://www.naph.org/Content/ContentGroups/Publications1/MON 2004_
9_Character2002.pdf.
2005] 539
540 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53
population. Medicaid is growing even faster, and now covers
fifty million Americans and accounts for $300 billion in
health care spending. 5 Meanwhile, the private employment-
based component of the system continues to shrink,6 in
large part because of the increasing cost of coverage. 7 In
addition, the percentage of uninsured persons is growing
alarmingly.8 Second, insured people are finding that their
coverage is shrinking, leaving them more responsibility for
coinsurance and co-payments. 9 As coverage becomes less
comprehensive, many people with insurance are finding
that the gaps in their coverage can drive them to
bankruptcy if they suffer an expensive period of illness. 10
The uninsured have far less certain access to health
care services than do people with insurance. They tend not
to have a usual source of care, and the care they receive is
uncoordinated. They tend to receive less physician care, and
to put off physician visits for preventive or curative care
longer than do people with insurance.11 The delays in
seeking routine care cause uninsured people to be
hospitalized at a high rate for conditions ordinarily treated
on an outpatient basis. 12 Chronic conditions that can be
5. See Cindy Mann & Tim Westmoreland, Attending to Medicaid, 32 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 416, 417 (2004).
6. See Glied & Borzi, supra note 2, at 405; Jon Holohan & Michael Wang,
Changes in Health Insurance Coverage During the Economic Downturn: 2000-
2002, at W4-31 to W4-32 (Jan. 28, 2004), at http://content.healthaffairs.org/
cgi/conent/full/hlthaff.w4.3 lvl/DC1.
7. See Jeanne M. Lambrew et al., Changes in Challenging Times: A Plan for
Extending And Improving Health Coverage, W5-119, W5-119 (Mar. 23, 2005), at
http://content. healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w5.119v1.pdf; Glied & Borzi,
supra note 2, at 405.
8. See Lambrew et al., supra note 7, at 119.
9. See John K. Inglehart, Changing Health Insurance Trends, 347 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 956, 958-60 (2002).
10. See Melissa B. Jacoby, Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren,
Rethinking the Debate Over Health Care Financing: Evidence from the
Bankruptcy Courts, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375, 405-06 (2001); Elizabeth Warren,
The Growing Threat to Middle Class Families, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 401, 417
(2004).
11. See Diane Rowland et al., Uninsured in America: Causes and
Consequences, in THE FUTURE U.S. HEALTHCARE SYSTEM: WHO WILL CARE FOR
THE POOR AND UNINSURED? 25, 36 (Stuart Altman et al. eds., 1998) [hereinafter
FUTURE U.S. HEALTHCARE SYSTEM].
12. See id. at 37.
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treated and managed by a physician, such as diabetes,
hypertension, and infectious diseases, then, result in twice
the rate of hospitalizations for the uninsured as for the
insured.13 The treatment of even relatively simple
conditions like appendicitis is affected by insurance status,
as people without insurance are 50% more likely to suffer a
ruptured appendix than are privately insured patients. 14 In
sum, those without insurance receive less care-preventive
and otherwise-and tend to receive care at times of crisis
and not at early stages of an illness. 15
The Institute of Medicine undertook an investigation of
health insurance in America that examined, among other
things, the health effects of un-insurance. The several
reports publishing the results of the investigation 16
demonstrated the factual chain by which lack of insurance
reduces utilization of health care services, and reduced
utilization of health care services leads to reduced health
status and early death.' 7 The lack of insurance affects
health status as measured by general health and also
incidence of mortality from acute conditions.' 8 Significantly
13. Id.
14. See id. at 37-38.
15. See Dianne Miller Wolman & Wilhelmine Miller, The Consequences of
Un-insurance for Individuals, Families, Communities, and the Nation, 32 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 397, 398 (2004).
16. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, A SHARED DESTINY: COMMUNITY EFFECTS OF UN-
INSURANCE (2003), available at http://www.nap.edufbooks/0309087260/html (last
visited May 19, 2005) [hereinafter SHARED DESTINY]; INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE,
CARE WITHOUT COVERAGE: Too LITTLE, Too LATE (2002), available at
http://www.nap.edu/books/ 0309083435/html (last visited May 19, 2005)
[hereinafter CARE WITHOUT COVERAGE]; INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, COVERAGE
MATTERS: INSURANCE AND HEALTH CARE (2001), available at
http://www.nap.edu/books/0309076099/html (last visited May 19, 2005)
[hereinafter COVERAGE MATTERS]; INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, HEALTH INSURANCE IS
A FAMILY MATTER (2002), available at http://www.nap.edu/open book/
0309085187/htmlfRl.html_#pagetop (last visited May, 19, 2005) [hereinafter
FAMILY MATTER]; INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, HIDDEN COSTS, VALUE LOST: UN-
INSURANCE IN AMERICA (2003), available at http://www.nap.edu/books/
030908931X/ html (last visited May 19, 2005) [hereinafter HIDDEN COSTS];
INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, INSURING AMERICA'S HEALTH: PRINCIPLES AND
RECOMMENDATIONS (2004), available at http://www.nap.edubooks/0309091055/
html (last visited May 19, 2005) [hereinafter INSURING AMERICA'S HEALTH].
17. See CARE WITHOUT COVERAGE, supra note 16, at 86-87.
18. See id. at 6.
2005]
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for purposes of this Article's discussion of health reform, 19
the health effects are particularly pronounced for people
with chronic illness. 20 People with hypertension who are
uninsured are more likely to have uncontrolled blood
pressure than people who are insured; those with end-stage
renal disease tend to have more severe renal failure when
they begin dialysis than those with insurance; and
uninsured people with mental illness are likely to
experience more uncontrolled psychiatric symptoms than
those with insurance. 21
The uninsured, then, face both health-related and
financial injuries as a result of their insurance status. They
have less access to health care, and as a consequence, have
measurably diminished health status and increased rates of
early death. The absence of the financial protection offered
by health insurance also threatens their financial well-
being, as uncovered bills for increasingly expensive health
care swamp the ability for most low and moderate income
families to remain fiscally afloat.
B. Safety Net Hospitals
The uninsured, as the ones who suffer the most direct
physical and financial harms from the gaps in our
insurance system, surely have first claim to moral and
public policy concerns over the shape of our health finance
system. There are many other social effects, however.
Those whose health is harmed by un-insurance diminish
productivity in the workplace and the nation. Their
inability to access appropriate primary care can increase
public health threats to society at large as communicable
diseases go undiagnosed and untreated. Health insurance
costs for those with coverage rise as providers attempt to
recoup for the cost of care provided to the uninsured by
shifting the costs to others. And the quality of life for family
members and other loved ones of the uninsured suffers as
19. See infra text accompanying notes 135-38, 154-55 (discussion of the
importance of chronic illness in designing health insurance system).
20. See CARE WITHOUT COVERAGE, supra note 16, at 6. See also Wolman &
Miller, supra note 15, at 399-400 (summarizing IOM findings on chronic
illness).
21. See Wolman & Miller, supra note 15, at 399.
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the effects of foregone care manifest themselves in
diminished health, higher stress, and early death. 22
This section focuses on one segment of the provider
community particularly affected by un-insurance: safety net
providers, and in particular nonprofit and public hospitals
in low-income areas. The health care safety net comprises
those providers of health care available to those who are
uninsured or underinsured-those who fall through the
cracks in America's health finance system. Indeed, it can be
argued powerfully that the health care safety net has
provided the opportunity for America to dither over
reforming the health insurance system over the last several
decades. But for the presence of these last-gasp,
unheralded, and under-funded institutions, the pressure to
respond to the crisis of un-insurance would certainly be
more intense.
America's institutional health safety net has been accomplishing
the task of meeting at least the basic needs of the uninsured and
underinsured in many areas. In fact, it can be argued that this
success is the main reason that American politicians have had the
luxury of endlessly (and fruitlessly) debating, rather than
enacting, universal coverage for the past 50 years.2 3
There is no organization of safety net providers.
Instead, they are the local governmental and nonprofit
providers of care that fill the gaps in a system otherwise
geared for patients who enter a facility with an insurance
card. They provide services to the uninsured, and also to
underinsured people, including beneficiaries of our troubled
Medicaid system24 and other vulnerable populations. 25
Some are required by law to provide for the poor and
underserved, while others do so as a matter of social
22. See HIDDEN COSTS, supra note 16, at 69; Wolman & Miller, supra note
15, at 400-03.
23. Larry S. Gage, The Future of Safety-Net Hospitals, in FUTURE U.S.
HEALTHCARE SYSTEM, supra note 11, at 123-25.
24. See Mann & Westmoreland, supra note 5, at 419 (describing the tension
evident in Medicaid expansion over the last decade, as states simultaneously
expand the categories of formal Medicaid eligibility while maintaining
"complicated and sometimes stigmatizing application and renewal procedures"
and suppressing provider reimbursement rates - a move that controls costs but
frustrates the goal of patient access).
25. See Siegel et al., supra note 4, at 426.
2005] 543
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
mission. 26 Safety net providers include "public or nonprofit
hospitals, community health centers, public health
department clinics, rural health clinics, free clinics and
sometimes individual physician practices. ' ' 27 Hospitals
serve as anchors to this array of safety net providers, and
for understandable reasons. Hospitals are large,
permanent, visible institutions that offer the capacity to
provide the spectrum of inpatient and outpatient services.
They are required by federal and state law to provide at
least some medically necessary services regardless of
insurance status. 28 These safety net hospitals include public
hospitals, academic medical centers, and nonprofit
hospitals located in poor and underserved communities. 29
Safety net hospitals provide a large proportion of the
health care provided to the uninsured. Members of the
National Association of Public Hospitals-an organization
largely comprising government-sponsored public facilities
in underserved areas-reported that about 21% of their
costs are devoted to care for the uninsured, with just eighty-
one of the members hospitals providing "almost a quarter of
the uncompensated hospital care in the country. 30
Academic medical centers-all but two of which are located
in urban areas 31-also provide a disproportionate share of
care to the poor. As a percentage of gross patient revenue,
academic medical centers provide twice the care to both
uninsured patients and Medicaid patients as to non-
teaching hospitals. 32 Safety net hospitals, like all hospitals,
26. See id.; John V. Jacobi, Mission and Markets in Health Care: Protecting
Essential Community Providers for the Poor, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 1431, 1473-75
(1997) (describing mission-driven safety net providers of health care).
27. Siegel et al., supra note 4, at 426. See also Gage, supra note 23, at 127-
28.
28. Siegel et al., supra note 4, at 427.
29. See id.; Singer et al., supra note 4, at 13-14 (describing governance
model of member institutions of the National Association of Public Hospitals
and Health Systems); Gage, supra note 23, at 127; James Reuter & Darrell J.
Gaskin, The Role of Academic Health Centers and Teaching Hospitals in
Providing Care for the Poor, in FUTURE U.S. HEALTHCARE SYSTEM, supra note 11,
at 151 (describing the role of academic medical centers in caring for the
uninsured).
30. Singer et al., supra note 4, at 2.
31. See Reuter & Gaskin, supra note 29, at 153.
32. Id. at 154.
[Vol. 53544
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increasingly provide care in outpatient settings. Their
provision of expensive and complex inpatient services is
essential to the well being of their poor and uninsured
patients. 33 This is an unsurprising concomitant of the fact
that uninsured patients tend to forego routine and
preventive care (in part because it is difficult for them to
access) until a crisis arises, often calling for much more
intensive treatment than would be needed by an insured
person with coverage for the full range of services. 34 The
"last resort" nature of safety net hospitals creates a small
but growing phenomenon: the "patient who can't leave." 35
These patients arrive at a hospital with an acute condition
requiring inpatient care-and no insurance. After the acute
episode is successfully addressed, the patient is ready for
discharge from the hospital for treatment and follow-up
therapy in a less intense setting such as a nursing home.
36
But, because the other settings have no obligation to treat
uninsured persons, the patient is stuck in the hospital, and
hospital with the patient.37
Safety net hospitals historically survived on direct
government support and charitable contributions. 38 The
passage of Medicare and Medicaid provided additional
support for care for the poor, although services for the
poor-whether uninsured or covered by Medicaid-
continued to be concentrated in safety net hospitals. 39 The
support added by the passage of Medicaid and Medicare
was partially offset, however, by the reduction in direct
government subsidy, which is now about 14-16% of costs
even for public hospitals. 40 To supplement shortfalls in
revenue from direct subsidies and government payers,
safety net hospitals have relied on cost-shifting, a
mechanism by which they shift excess revenue received on
33. See Gage, supra note 23, at 128-33; Siegel et al., supra note 4, at 427.
34. See Rowland, supra note 11, at 36.
35. See Angela Stewart, Hospitals' new problem: Patients who can't leave,
NEWARK STAR-LEDGER, March 6, 2005, at 1.
36. Id. at 16.
37. Id.
38. See Gage, supra note 23, at 126.
39. Id.
40. See Singer et al., supra note 4, at 2.
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behalf of insured patients to pay for care for the poor. 41 This
informal cross-subsidy was always difficult for safety net
hospitals, given their lower percentage of privately insured
patients.42 The arrival of the managed care revolution
added further challenges to funding for these facilities.
The sweeping adoption of managed care principles in
commercial and public insurance injected an emphasis on
market methods of financing into the funding for safety net
hospitals. The hospitals' response to managed care has
included initiatives ranging from increasing quality and
patient satisfaction, reorganizing facilities to prune those
deemed redundant or most difficult to finance, and even
entering the managed care business for themselves. 43 One
negative effect of managed care on safety net hospitals has
been a reduction in the ability to cross-subsidize charity
patients with revenue for commercial payers.
As managed care organizations created closed networks
of hospitals or fashioned incentives for their members to
favor in-network hospitals, prices charged by hospitals
came under particular scrutiny. The high intensity of care
for the poor and uninsured, and the unsponsored cost of
that care, drove up the average cost of safety net hospitals
in comparison to other available providers of hospital care.
This effect was particularly pronounced for academic
medical centers, which had both the cost of medical
education and the excess of diagnostic services ordered by
doctors in training to add to their bills.44 The expansion of
Medicaid managed care has been a particular concern, as
hospitals now have to bargain for price with an array of
managed care organizations focused on the bottom line
rather than state governments with more nuanced motives
in price negotiations. As is true with commercial managed
care, Medicaid managed care threatens to shift paying
patients (in this case, those insured by Medicaid) from
historical safety net providers to those offering lower per-
patient charges. 45
41. See Gage, supra note 23, at 136; Reuter & Gaskin, supra note 29, at 152.
42. See Gage, supra note 23, at 136.
43. See Siegel et al., supra note 4, at 429-30.
44. See Reuter & Gaskin, supra note 29, at 155-56.
45. See Gage, supra note 23, at 139-40.
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Safety net hospitals have felt the pinch of these new
market conditions. 46 They have adjusted, however.47 They
have seen a rebound in their share of Medicaid patients in
recent years, in part through their own efforts, 48 in part due
perhaps to the erosion in the power of managed care firms
to direct their patients to particular hospitals. 49 They
continue to provide a significant percentage of the services
received by the uninsured, particularly expensive inpatient
services. 50 How will future reform efforts affect safety net
hospitals? There is a bit of a paradox here. As Bruce Siegel
has noted:
Viewed simplistically, any initiatives that increase
insurance coverage should have a positive impact on the
viability of the safety net, as the uninsured are
converted to covered lives. Truly universal health care
with meaningful benefits and portability, without
onerous cost-sharing, would dramatically reduce the
uncompensated care burden of all health care providers.
It should most dramatically improve the viability of
those with the greatest load, namely those in the safety
net. 5 1
But, as Dr. Siegel notes, "the devil may be in the details
for the safety net."52 The caveats he embeds in the above
analysis are telling; it is unlikely that we will see the "truly
universal" in its complete form in the near future. In the
absence of truly universal coverage, there will remain a
population of uninsured persons who will seek care, as the
46. See Singer et al., supra note 4, at 1 (reporting that public hospitals
experienced negative operating margins, and margins almost 5% below those of
all hospitals nationally).
47. See Siegel et al., supra note 4, at 429-30 (describing business strategies
undertaken by safety net hospitals in reaction to market changes).
48. See Singer et al., supra note 4, at 3-4 (describing improved screening
efforts and enhanced services for labor, delivery, and recovery services).
49. See James C. Robinson, The End of Managed Care, 285 JAMA 2622,
2623 (2001) Managed care organizations are evolving, and reducing their
emphasis on restricting members to narrow networks. Id.
50. See Singer et al., supra note 4, at 5-6 (stating that 32% of NAPH
member hospitals' services were provided to Medicaid recipients; 25% were
provided to "self-pay" uninsured patients).
51. Siegel et al., supra note 4, at 428.
52. Id.
BUFFALO LA W REVIEW
uninsured always do, with safety net providers, and in
particular with safety net hospitals. As Siegel points out,
however, incremental reform in the past has both reduced
the ability of safety net hospitals to cross-subsidize, and has
lessened the political will to support safety net providers
(perhaps on the mistaken assumption that such support
was no longer needed).53 Those who remain uninsured-
undocumented aliens, those between opportunities for
coverage, and other groups likely to be omitted from
incremental reform-will seek help from providers that
may be less able to provide it. We are likely to see further
incremental attempts to modestly reform the health finance
system. The following Part examines two such incremental
reforms.
II. REFORM EFFORTS: THE MOVEMENT FROM UNIVERSAL
COVERAGE - AND BACK AGAIN.
A. Continued Unease, Renewed Creativity, and Little
Traction
In the late eighties and early nineties, many states
responded to the growing crisis of un-insurance by
advancing broadly systemic reform of various
descriptions.5 4  Those efforts uniformly, 55  leading to
increased interest in a federal effort at systemic reform. The
Clinton reform plan of 1993-94 was premised on sweeping
principles. It began with the "bedrock assumption that all
Americans must be guaranteed health coverage. ' '56 It
promised more: savings, choice, quality, simplicity, and
53. See id.
54. See Lawrence D. Brown & Michael S. Sparer, Window Shopping: State
Health Reform Politics In The 1990s, 20:1 HEALTH AFF. 50, 60-61 (2001),
available at http:/ content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/20/l/50 (last visited May
19, 2005).
55. See id. at 61.
56. Walter Zelman, The Rationale Behind the Clinton Health Care Reform
Plan, 13:1 HEALTH AFF. 9, 10 (1994), available at http://content.healthaffairs.
org/cgi/reprint/13/1/9 (last visited May 19, 2005). See HEALTH SECURITY ACT, HR
3600/S1757 (1993), § 3 (Act intended to "guarantee comprehensive and secure
health care coverage").
[Vol. 53548
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responsibility. 57 The defeat of the Clinton initiative has
been attributed to many factors, including a level of support
for reform in the electorate insufficient to overcome the
interests of those fearful of losing favored positions in the
current system, 58 and confusion of the reform message by
an excessive effort to compromise. 59 Whatever the cause of
this defeat, the order of the day that followed was
incrementalism at the federal and state levels, by which
modest (but important) changes such as i.surance
portability guarantees and expansions of public insurance
programs have been the focus of reform efforts. 60
More recently, interest in systemic reform has resumed.
In a thoughtful recent book, Timothy Jost has argued that
in the long run, American incrementalists' substantial
reliance on market mechanisms "will not do the job-they
cannot expand access and are unlikely to restrain costs." 61
After describing the history of America's failure to achieve
universal health coverage and comprehensively describing
universal coverage plans in several countries, Jost declines
to set out a "blueprint for the reconstruction of the health-
care system."6 2 Instead, he emphasizes that any plan
effective at constraining costs and assuring access must
take as fundamental individuals' legal rights, or
entitlements, to coverage.
57. Zelman, supra note 56, at 11.
58. See Judith Feder, Crowd-out and the Politics of Health Reform, 32 J.
LAW, MED. & ETHICS 461, 463 (2004); Henry J. Aaron, Less Is More: After the
Clinton Plan, Let's Think Small, in FUTURE U.S. HEALTHCARE SYSTEM, supra
note 11, at 233, 237-38.
59. See Constance A. Nathanson, The Skeptic's Guide to a Movement for
Universal Health Insurance, 28 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & LAw 443, 460-63 (2003);
THEDA SKOCPOL, BOOMERANG: CLINTON'S HEALTH SECURITY EFFORT AND THE
TURN AGAINST GOVERNMENT IN U.S. POLITICS 178-79 (1996).
60. See Michael S. Sparer, Leading the Health Policy Orchestra: The Need fo
an Intergovernmental Partnership, 28 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & LAW 245, 256-57
(2003); JACOB S. HACKER, THE DIVIDED WELFARE STATE 266-67 (2002); Judith
Feder et al., Covering The Low-Income Uninsured: the Case For Expanding
Public Programs, 20:1 HEALTH AFF. 27, 28-29 (2001), available at
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/20/l/ 27 (last visited May 19, 2005).
61. TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST, DISENTITLEMENT? THE THREATS FACING OUR
PUBLIC HEALTH-CARE PROGRAMS AND A RIGHTS-BASED RESPONSE 279 (2003).
62. Id. at 277.
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The important point is that in designing or evaluating health-care
systems it is vital to consider the role of legal rights. Legal rights
obviously play a central role in assuring patients (or insureds or
consumers) access to health-care goods and services. But if
resources for providing health care are not unbounded, rights also
cannot be unbounded; rather, they must be rights to a process that
determines in some equitable and reasonable way where the
boundaries should be. Finally, in fact, rights must be rights to
health care, not merely rights to purchase health insurance if one
is wealthy-or healthy--enough.63
Another recent call for a return to reforms directed at
universal coverage came from the Institute of Medicine
project described above. 64 After several years of study, and
after the publication of several interim reports, the
Institute of Medicine's Committee on the Consequences of
Un-insurance found that the un-insurance problem is
growing despite incremental efforts to reverse the trend;
the absence of insurance renders people sicker and more
likely to suffer premature death; and that families,
communities and society at large is harmed by the gaps in
our current health finance system. 65 It concluded:
The evidence of the Committee's reports on the problems related to
un-insurance leads to a logical conclusion-that the interests of
our nation and its residents are best served by adopting policies
that result in everyone having coverage . . . . Incremental
approaches that are geographically limited, narrowly targeted to a
subgroup of the uninsured, temporary, and commit too few new
dollars are inadequate to address the problem at hand. 66
What do the approaches of Professor Jost and the
Institute of Medicine have in common? Both advance as
their principal thesis that universal coverage is necessary
and appropriate in a just and equitable health finance
system. 67 But neither advances a specific program of
63. Id.
64. See supra text accompanying notes 16-22.
65. INSURING AMERICA'S HEALTH, supra note 16, at 153.
66. Id. at 153-54.
67. See id. at 154 ("[T]he interests of our nation and its residents are best
served by adopting policies that result in everyone having coverage."); JOST,
supra note 61, at 6 (describing a goal of health reform as "secur[ing) for all
Americans an entitlement to health care and to all of its benefits."); id. at 270
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reforms to reach the goal of universal coverage. After
canvassing the interaction of private and public actors in
the United States, Great Britain, and Germany, Professor
Jost chooses to focus on the importance of establishing
enforceable entitlements to care and coverage, and not
exclusively on the vehicle through which coverage is
provided. Although he clearly favors a single-payer model
as the most efficient and most protective of individuals'
entitlement to care, he recognizes that other nations-the
Netherlands and Germany, for example-have achieved
near-universal coverage with a mixed public and private
system. 68 He also acknowledges that the culture and
political history in the United States may counsel a larger
role for internal competition than is present in other
systems. 69
The Institute of Medicine similarly emphasized the
overarching goal of assured universal coverage rather than
the nature of the system that would provide such assured
coverage.7 0 The Institute's report instead sets our four
"prototypes" that could serve as vehicles for achieving
universal coverage: a single payer system in which a federal
agency would centrally administer a single, comprehensive
benefits package financed through general tax dollars; 71 a
combination of our current mixed public-private insurance
system with expanded public programs, a mandate on non-
poor individuals to purchase coverage, and a tax credit to
aid in financing that purchase;72 a combination of our
current mixed public-private insurance system with
expanded public programs, a mandate that employers cover
employees, a mandate for individuals not covered at their
place of employment to purchase coverage, and subsidies to
assist both employers and individuals;73 and an expansion
of public insurance, and federal financial support for
("[Wie should aim for an entitlement program that covers the entire
population.").
68. See JOST, supra note 61, at 270.
69. Id. at 273-75.
70. See PRINCIPLES AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 16, at 155.
71. See id. at 131.
72. See id. at 129-30.
73. See id. at 128-29.
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employers and individuals who purchase coverage, which
purchase would not, however, be mandated.74
Professor Jost's and the Institute of Medicine's
proposals can be seen as an evolutionary stage in the
American struggle between systemic and incremental
reform. Both advance universal reform in the sense that
they focus on the importance of assuring that every resident
of the United States be assured of coverage and access to
care. They are less focused on describing precisely the
means by which universal coverage may be achieved;
Professor Jost allows room for substantial America-specific
tinkering with basic single payer systems, and the Institute
of Medicine goes no further than describing a varied menu
of program designs that could, if coupled with legal rights
and adequate funding, achieve the goal of universal access.
The two, then, represent a melding of universal reformers'
insistence on coverage for all with incrementalists'
openness to pragmatic design experimentation.
This melding of the conceptual branches of health
finance reform has great promise. Key to its success as a
vehicle for achieving successful reform is the continuing
development of mechanisms for coverage that can be
plugged into a program of universal coverage. Both
Professor Jost and the Institute of Medicine incorporate
many design choices into their analysis. The next two parts
of this Article examine two emerging mechanisms for
adjusting health finance to achieve the goal of health
coverage more efficiently and effectively. The two
mechanisms-consumer- directed health care and
government reinsurance of market coverage-have been the
subject of substantial attention by health finance
policymakers.
B. Consumer-Directed Health Care
Consumer-driven health care rejects the notion (central
to managed care) that consumers need expert help to make
health purchasing decisions. It directs itself to "getting
[health plans] out from between the consumer and the
services the consumer wants to consume. '' 75 Plans that
74. See id. at 126-27.
75. James C. Robinson, Renewed Emphasis on Consumer Cost Sharing in
[Vol. 5 3552
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manage care are criticized for assuming "patient
ignorance,"7 6 and patient directed plans are advanced as
means to further consumer autonomy and contain costs. 77
Employers see patient directed plans as a means to reduce
their own financial exposure for increasing health costs by
shifting part of the responsibility to their employees. 78 The
spectrum of consumer-driven arrangements runs from the
mild version, in which consumers are given incentives in
the form of tiered pricing to internalize some of the
marginal cost of expensive providers, to the stronger
version in which consumers are given the power and
responsibility to choose their care and their provider, at
least for a portion of the services they receive.
Consumer-driven plans' cost-containment rests on the
assertion that raising the amount of health costs directly
borne by consumers will reduce consumption of health care
services.79 The simplest way for health plans to couple this
Health Insurance Benefit Design, W139, W145 (Mar. 20, 2002), at
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w2.139vl ("[H]ealth plans
increasingly interpret their role as one of packaging health care services,
pricing them at actuarially sustainable rates, gathering and disseminating
information, promoting electronic conductivity among all participants, and
otherwise getting out from between the consumer and the services the
consumer wants to consume.").
76. See John C. Goodman, Designing Health Insurance for the Information
Age, in CONSUMER-DRIVEN HEALTH CARE: IMPLICATIONS FOR PROVIDERS, PAYERS,
AND POLICYMAKERS 224, 224-26 (Regina E. Herzlinger ed., 2004) (criticizing
managed care methods as basing a strategy on "patient ignorance" thereby
denying consumers choice in selecting medical treatment). Portions of this
section of this Article draws from Part I(C) of John V. Jacobi, Consumer-Driven
Health Care and the Chronically ill, 38 MICH. J. LAW REF._(forthcoming 2005)
(manuscript on file with author).
77. Goodman, supra note 76, at 235-39 (arguing for the value of informed
consumer choice and direct consumer power to select care). See also John V.
Jacobi, After Managed Care: Gray Boxes, Tiers, and Consumerism, 47 ST. LOUIS
U. L.J. 397, 406 (2003) ("The promise of most consumer-driven plans is that
consumers themselves can act as prudent purchasers if given the chance,
obviating the need for managed care plans to act as expert intermediaries
between consumers and providers ... ").
78. See Wendy K. Mariner, Can Consumer Choice Plans Satisfy Patients?
Problems with Theory and Practice in Health Insurance Contracts, 69 BROOK. L.
REV. 485, 504-05 (2004) (describing the cost benefits to employers of various
types of new health plans).
79. See MARK A. HALL, MAKING MEDICAL SPENDING DECISIONS: THE LAW,
ETHICS, AND ECONOMICS OF RATIONING MECHANISMS 26 (1997) ("Empirical
studies verify that patients subject to increased cost sharing spend dramatically
554 BUFFALO LAWREVIEW [Vol. 53
basic cost-containment device with a means for consumers
to exercise greater autonomy in health care choices is to
relate cost-sharing to the price of the service, so that a
provider charging the plan a high price could be accessed
only with the payment of a high co-payment, while a lower-
price (to the plan) provider could be used with the payment
of a lower co-payment.80 This use of tiers permits members
to choose from a broad range of providers, but forces them
to bear a part of the excess cost, thereby presumably
damping their enthusiasm for the most expensive
providers.
The practice is most common in pharmaceutical
benefits, where most plans now separate available drugs
into three tiers-generic drugs, lower-cost name brand
drugs, and higher-cost name brand drugs-with co-
payments rising from tier to tier.8 x The practice has spread
to other services, including physicians and hospitals. This
practice serves the plan's interests in extricating itself
somewhat from its mediating role, while maintaining some
level of incentive for employees to use lower-cost providers:
An emerging set of health insurance benefit designs seeks to
retain some of the advantages of provider coordination while
broadening consumer choice. Rather than arm-wrestling with
doctors and medical groups under the implicit threat of network
exclusion, these insurance products include any willing physician
and provider organization but pass the differences in fee levels on
to the consumer through higher premiums or co-payments. At the
extreme, these insurance product designs do not negotiate fees at
all, creating a market that permits providers to charge whatever
they think their patients are willing to pay and that permits
consumers to choose among all providers rather than be limited to
a contracted subset. The premium charged to the employer covers
less on health care than those who are fully insured."). See generally JOSEPH P.
NEWHOUSE ET AL., FREE FOR ALL? LESSONS FROM THE RAND HEALTH INSURANCE
EXPERIMENT (1993) (describing and analyzing the RAND Health Insurance
Experiment).
80. See Jacobi, supra note 77, at 403-04.
81. See Haiden A. Huskamp, et al., The Effect of Incentive-Based
Formularies on Prescription Drug Utilization and Spending, 349 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 2224, 2225 (2003) ("As of spring 2002, 57% of workers in the United
States who had drug benefits were enrolled in plans with a three-tier
formulary."); Geoffrey F. Joyce et al., Employer Drug Benefit Plans and
Spending on Prescription Drugs, 288 JAMA 1733, 1734 (2002) (describing range
of co-payment schemes in drug benefit plans).
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most or all of the fees charged by low-cost providers, while the
employee pays the full incremental cost of the fees charged by
more expensive providers. 82
The move to pricing tiers allows a half-step between
more traditional forms of managed care and fuller forms of
consumer-driven care. But even the quite aggressive use of
tiers fails to address some central concerns of the consumer-
driven health care movement. To the extent plans are
screening some providers out before creating tiers, they are
still mediating between consumers and their choice of
health care at some autonomy cost to members. To the
extent the graduated co-payments only signal, rather than
pass on, the marginal cost of expensive providers, plans are
merely using proxies for markets instead of employing them
directly. The starker break with traditional health plans
comes with the consumer-driven plan that combines a
spending account with a high-deductible plan, a consumer-
driven option that is much discussed, much supported by
recent changes in law,8 3 and slowly finding a place in the
market.8 4
The central form of CDHP has three parts-or maybe
two parts and a gap.8 5 One version of CDHP provides, first,
for payment of an amount into a Health Savings Account
82. Robinson, supra note 75, at W147 to W148.
83. See infra text accompanying notes 103-06.
84. See James C. Robinson, Reinvention of Health Insurance in the
Consumer Era, 291 JAMA 1880, 1882 (2004) ('The most discussed, if least-
purchased, contemporary innovation in benefit design is a product that
combines a high-deductible PPO with an employer-financed but employee-
managed and tax exempt health savings account .. "); Jon Christianson et al.,
Defined -Contribution Health Insurance Products: Development and Prospects,
21:1 HEALTH AFF. 49, 50 (2002) (describing high visibility but low market
penetration of these arrangements), available at http://content.healthaffairs.
org/cgilreprint/21/l/49 (last visited May 19, 2005).
85. See Jon B. Christianson, et al., Consumer Experiences in a Consumer-
Driven Health Plan, 39 HEALTH SERVS. RESEARCH 1123, 1123-24 (2004)
("Consumer-driven health plans" has been applied to various structures, but
"[r]ecently ... the most common use of the term has been in reference to benefit
plans with three core features: a personal care account; insurance coverage
designed to create a 'gap' between the dollars in the account and the level at
which a deductible is reached; and various Internet support tools" to assist
consumers.).
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
("HSA")8 6 that the consumer and her dependents may use
for payment of health expenses. Second, it provides that the
consumer has a deductible that the consumer must pay out
of her own funds after the HSA is exhausted. Third, it
provides insurance that attaches after the HSA
contribution plus the deductible have been expended. The
residual insurance may have co-payments, subject to out-
of-pocket limits, as does more traditional insurance.8 7
Consumers, then, would have substantial control over and
responsibility for their health spending. This, of course, is
the raison d'etre for CDHPs: to reverse or blunt the effect of
moral hazard, the artificial willingness to overspend that
may follow from traditional third-party insurance, and that
is often described as the basis for high American health
care costs.8 8 At one end, the plan first provides a tax-
favored spending account for the employee-called a
"health savings account" by the Medicare Modernization
Act, from which the employee can purchase health care
services.8 9 At the other end, the plan provides a high-
deductible health insurance plan-a traditional PPO, but
with coverage that does not attach until the employee has
incurred a large deductible. 90 The plan then ordinarily
requires the employee to pay an additional unfunded
deductible, 91 although this additional deductible is not
86. See Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act
of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, §1201, 117 Stat. 2469 (2003).
87. See § 1201(c)(2) (defining "high deductible health plan" for purposes of
the Act).
88. See generally Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L.
REV. 237 (1996); M. Gregg Bloche, The Invention of Health Law, 91 CAL. L. REV.
247, 260-66 (2003) (describing the use of moral hazard in analyzing health
insurance structure); William M. Sage, Managed Care's Crimea: Medical
Necessity, Therapeutic Benefit and the Goals of Administrative Process in
Health Insurance, 53 DUKE L.J. 597, 606-07 (2003) (discussing managed care
mechanisms intended to counter moral hazard).
89. See Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act §
1201(a) (amending IRC § 223 and defining "Health Savings Account").
90. See § 1201(a) (defining "High Deductible Health Plan").
91. See Jon R. Gabel et al., Consumer-Driven Health Plans: Are They More
Than Talk Now?, W395, W396 (Nov. 20, 2002), at http://content.healthaffairs.
org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff. w2.395vl ("When the account is exhausted, enrollees
must typically pay out of pocket until the annual deductible is met, after which
the plan becomes a traditional major medical plan.").
[Vol. 53556
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required for the savings account to maintain favored tax
status.92
HSAs, health savings accounts, are the heart of
CDHPs. Through this mechanism, the plans give members
a sense of ownership over the funds and encourage them to
be careful purchasers of health services. 93 Through this
mechanism, consumers are encouraged to participate in a
genuine market for health care services, making judgments,
as with any consumer purchase, as to the utility of
spending as opposed to saving "their" money. Several
conditions encourage this sense of ownership. A consumer is
likely to feel greater ownership of funds, and therefore use
greater care in spending them, if his ownership rights do
not disappear on an arbitrary date such as the end of the
tax year. In 2002, the IRS facilitated the expansion of
CDHPs when it ruled that unspent funds in a spending
account could roll over from tax year to tax year,
maintaining the funds tax-favored status.94 The Medicare
Modernization Act codified that result in statute.95 The
sense of ownership is also enhanced if the fund both rolls
over and can be converted to other uses if not used for
health care.96 Prior to the passage of the Medicare
Modernization Act, funds in spending accounts could only
be used for medical services. The Act, however, permits the
funds to be withdrawn after the beneficiary reaches
retirement age with no penalty, and is subject to tax only as
ordinary income; the spending account, under those
92. See § 1201(a) (permitting the amount of contribution to the health
savings account to equal the amount of the deductible of the high-deductible
health plan).
93. See Mark V. Pauly & John C. Goodman, Tax Credits for Health
Insurance and Medical Savings Accounts, 14:1 HEALTH AFF., 125, 130 (1995)
(arguing that if consumers are assigned specific funds in a spending account
devoted to their own benefit, that they will treat them as their own).
94. See Rev. Rul. 2002-41, 2002-2 C.B. 75; I.R.S. NOTICE 2002-45, 2002-2
C.B. 93.
95. See Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act §
1201(a) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
96. See Pauly & Goodman, supra note 93, at 130 (stating that incentives to
overspend on medical care are reduced if funds in the spending account "can
eventually be used for purposes other than medical services .... ").
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circumstances, converts to the functional equivalent of an
individual retirement account. 97
This mechanism is obviously aimed at blunting the
effect of moral hazard. Employees "own" a fund available to
cover a portion of health expenditures. When faced with a
spending decision, then, they will tend to balance the cost of
a proposed service more carefully against the benefits, as
they have a much more direct stake in the expenditure than
in a system in which they are wholly or partially covered by
third party insurance for their care. If, as many acerbic
critics of current third-party insurance insist, the single
greatest cause of health inflation is the absence of a true
consumer-driven market for health care, then HSAs are
central to changes in health insurance. 98 In a simple
package, they address the frustration consumers express
about interference with medical judgments, and address
plan sponsors' concerns about health cost increases. The
Medicare Modernization Act permits HSA funds to roll over
without limit, permitting accumulated funds to serve
primarily as a source for medical spending, but ultimately
as a source of retirement funds. 99 The President's Council of
Economic Advisors has singled out this strong consumer
ownership provision of the Medicare Modernization Act as a
particularly important aspect of the cost-containment value
of consumer-driven health care:
Once [an HSA is] established, this money belongs to the individual
and can accumulate over time. The account remains with the
individual if he or she changes employers ... With less reliance
on insurance for routine health expenses, consumers would place a
greater value on information about health care options and
97. See § 1201(a) (amending IRC § 223(f)(4)). See also Barry L. Salkin,
Health Savings Account: A New Defined Contribution Health Plan, 72 PRAc. TAX
STRATEGIES 196, 199 (2004) (describing retirement tax benefit).
98. See CONSUMER-DRIVEN HEALTH CARE, supra note 76, at 58 (identifying
the cause of "massive expenditures on health care: "To me, the reason is obvious:
health care systems worldwide are guided by someone other than the consumer."
(italics in original)); JOHN C. GOODMAN & GERALD L. MUSGRAVE, PATIENT POWER:
SOLVING AMERICA'S HEALTH CARE CRISIS 12 (1992) ("In most other sectors of our
economy, individuals who make decisions realize most of the benefit from good
ones and bear most of the cost of bad ones .... The market for health care
could be organized in a similar way.").
99. See Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act §
1201(a) (amending IRC § 223(d)).
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providers. More prudent use of insurance would also reduce
"middle-man" costs involving an insurance company in what could
otherwise be a simple transaction between the patient and the
caregiver. 10
0
HSAs, then, provide a fund, considerably under the
control of consumers, from which a broad range of health
services may be purchased.
The second element of these consumer-driven plans is a
gap in coverage between the limits of an HSA and the
attachment point of the high-deductible health plan. This
deductible, along with the sense of ownership of HAS funds,
is intended to minimize the distortions attributed to the
moral hazard associated with third-party insurance. 10 1 The
arguments for the cost-containing effects of HSAs based on
a member's sense of ownership for the funds apply even
more directly to an additional deductible, as the out of
pocket funds are literally owned by the member. Members'
dislike of large deductibles can be addressed to a certain
extent by permitting the unspent HSA funds to roll over,
permitting members at least the possibility that they could
avoid all or part of the deductible in future years. The
deductible, then, would not pose a barrier to PPO coverage
for members who had been able to build up funds in their
HSA because they had few health care needs in previous
years (although the roll-over feature is a double-edged
sword, as it lessens CDHPs' ability to blunt the effect of
moral hazard). After the first year of coverage, the
deductible would serve as an additional check on spending
(and an additional direct savings of funds for the plan
sponsor) only for those members who had reason to use the
funds in their HSA in previous years.
The third element of CDHPs is high-deductible
insurance that attaches after the exhaustion of the HSA
and the deductible. Advocates of consumer-driven health
care readily acknowledge that there is a place for health
insurance in its traditional sense, in which insureds or their
sponsors pool funds against the possibility of large
100. See ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS: ECONOMIC
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, H.R. Doc. No. 108-145, at 199-200 (2d Sess. 2004).
101. See Pauly & Goodman, supra note 93, at 129 (suggesting that moral
hazard can be combated by setting up system by which plan members pay at
least some expenses out of pocket).
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unexpected health costs. 10 2 They object to "insurance"
coverage of predictable, routine, relatively minor
expenses. 103 Other than the fact that it has an unusually
high deductible, the coverage that attaches at the back end
of consumer-driven coverage creates few novel concerns. It
can incorporate routine cost-sharing requirements and in-
and out-of-network price differentials as do most traditional
health coverage, subject to annual out-of-pocket maximums.
C. Government as Reinsurer
Private, employer-based health insurance can be
relatively cost-effective, even when compared with public
health insurance programs. 104 With smaller groups, the
administrative costs-including those attributable to sales
commission, underwriting costs, advertising costs, and
profits can rise dramatically. 105 This is particularly true in
the individual insurance market, in which insurance is
purchased by individual consumers for themselves or
themselves and their families only. In the individual
insurance market, the "load," the cost of coverage above
that needed to pay for patient care, can rise to 30% to 40%
of premiums. 106
102. See Pauly & Goodman, supra note 93, at 129 (advocating the coupling
of individual spending accounts with "catastrophic" (high deductible) health
insurance); GOODMAN & MUSGRAVE, supra note 98, at 44 (advocating high-
deductible insurance).
103. See CONSUMER-DRIVEN HEALTH CARE, supra note 76, at 61-64 (likening
low-deductible health insurance to "breakfast insurance," in which one
purchases coverage for the cost of breakfast); Phil Gramm, Why We Need
Medical Savings Accounts, 330 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1752, 1752 (1994) (likening
low-deductible health coverage to "grocery insurance"); GOODMAN & MUSGRAVE,
supra note 98, at 58 (criticizing traditional Medicare for paying for minor
expenses that beneficiaries could budget for on a routine basis, while failing to
cover truly catastrophic costs such as custodial nursing home care).
104. See David A. Hyman & Mark Hall, Two Cheers for Employment-Based
Health Insurance, 2 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 23, 31 (2001)
(administrative costs for large group private insurance can be as low as 5% of
premium).
105. See id.; Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Private or Public Approaches to
Insuring the Uninsured: Lessons from International Experience with Private
Insurance, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 419, 427 (2001).
106. See Jost, supra note 105, at 427 (stating that loads in the individual
insurance market can account for 35% - 40% of premium); Hyman & Hall, supra
note 104, at 31 (stating loads can "go above 30% for individual purchasers").
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Some of the extra administrative cost of small group
and individual insurance is attributable to diseconomies of
scale. It simply costs more per member to administer a plan
covering a few people than it costs per member to
administer a very large group. But a significant part of the
extra cost of small group and individual insurance is
attributable to the "risk premium"-the additional
premium charged by insurers in anticipation that
individuals purchasing insurance, or some members of a
small group, will be at high risk for significant health costs,
rendering the premium bargain a losing proposition for the
insurer.10 7 The risk of adverse selection-that is, the self-
selection for coverage of a disproportionate number of high-
risk persons-is perceived to be high in the individual and
small group markets. In part this is because ihe high
administrative costs of small group and individual
insurance renders those forms of insurance too expensive
for persons who do not anticipate that they will be at risk
for high health care costs in during the coverage period; in
part it is because insurers believe that people who are not
employed by large firms, particularly those who are self-
employed or unemployed, tend to be less healthy.
Individual and small group insurance comprise a
relatively small but important part of the American health
insurance market. The high administrative costs for these
forms of coverage, and particularly the attempts by insurers
to avoid high-risk customers when selling this form of
coverage, create a form of market failure crying out for a
regulatory response.'0 8 The governmental response to this
problem over the last two decades has included programs of
reinsurance, by which government provides (or finances)
coverage for claims by members of small group insurance
and/or purchasers of individual insurance when their
claims exceed a threshold amount during the coverage
period.109
107. See Jost, supra note 105, at 428.
108. See Main C. Enthoven & Sara J. Singer, Market-Based Reform: What to
Regulate and by Whom, 14:1 HEALTH AFF., 105, 106 (1995), available at
http://content.healthaffairs. org/cgilreprint/14/l/105 (last visited May 19, 2005).
109. See Deborah Chollet, Issue Brief: The Role of Reinsurance in State
Efforts to Expand Coverage, in ACADEMY HEALTH No. 4, at 1 (2004), available at
http:/Iwww. statecoverage.net/pdf/issuebriefl004.pdf (last visited May 19, 2005)
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The most familiar form of government reinsurance is
the high-risk pool, in which people uninsurable in the open
market find insurance through specially-constructed pools
for people who have been and are predicted to be high cost
consumers of health care. 110 Individuals with underwriting
indications of high risk, who would otherwise be denied
coverage, are offered membership in a high-risk pool. The
premiums are sometimes capped at a multiple of the
average premium of a similarly situated well person, and
benefits levels limits may be less rich than in standard
policies."' In Idaho, for example, all carriers are required to
guarantee issue of a high-risk product, and may charge a
premium that is capped at 200% of the average premium
for a standard-risk member. Even with this higher
premiuih, reinsurance is necessary. The allocation of
responsibility between the carrier and the reinsuring state
is allocated as follows:
Each carrier is responsible for the initial $5,000 of benefits paid
per calendar year for each enrollee in a high-risk pool plan, as well
as 10 percent of the next $25,000. Above these amounts, the High-
Risk Reinsurance Pool fully reinsures the enrollee. 112
The funding for the reinsurance pool comes to the state
from an assessment on health carriers; 1 3 the carriers,
therefore, are spreading the risk among themselves, and
eventually to all of their insureds.
High-risk pools are well-established, and almost
uniformly quite small." 4 Recently, however, states have
expanded the concept of reinsurance of private insurance to
110. See Katherine Swartz, Government as Reinsurer for Very-High-Cost
Persons in Nongroup Health Insurance Markets, W380 (Oct. 23, 2002), at
http://content.healthaffairs. org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w2.349vl?ck=nck; Len M.
Nichols, State Regulation: What Have We Learned So Far?, 25 J. HEALTH POL.
POL'Y & L. 176, 178 (2000). See also Kaiser Family Foundation, State Sponsored
High Risk Insurance Pools (2003), at http://www.statehealth
facts.org/cgin/healthfacts.cgi?action=compare&category=Managed+Care+%26+
Health+Insurance&subcategory=State+Sponsored+High+Risk+Pools&topic=Hi
gh+Risk+Pools (last visited Apr. 11, 2005).
111. See Kaiser Family Foundation, supra note 110 (gathering state plan
descriptions).
112. Chollet, supra note 109, at 2.
113. See Kaiser Family Foundation, supra note 110.
114. See Chollet, supra note 109, at 2-4.
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serve a broader social goal: the stabilization and support of
the general individual and small group insurance
markets. 115  Through reinsurance, states attempt to
"improve the predictability of claims, and reduce the mark-
up of premiums that insurers charge as a buffer against
unanticipated claims. 11 6 As is stated above, small group
and individual insurance is more expensive than large
group insurance, resulting in higher rates of insurance for
people who are self-employed, unemployed, or working for a
small employer. While part of the higher cost is the
diseconomy of scale caused by individual and small group
sales and servicing, a significant portion of the higher cost
is attributable to the risk premium caused by fears of
adverse selection in these markets. 117 Through this form of
reinsurance, government permits the private carriers to
operate as market participants, competing with each other
on the basis of quality, service, and price, while moderating
the cost effects of the risk exposure inherent in these
markets:
If the government becomes the reinsurer in nongroup [and small
group] markets, these markets can operate more efficiently. The
costs of producing health insurance will be lower, which will
reduce premiums and ought to induce more uninsured people to
purchase coverage.
Having the government assume the role of reinsurer also
spreads the burden of the costs of very-high-cost people from the
relatively small number of people insured by any particular carrier
to the broader population base of all taxpayers.1 18
These reinsurance programs are designed so as to
moderate the risk premium while leaving an incentive with
the insurance company to manage the cost of care:
For example, government reinsurance might be initiated when a
person spends more than $30,000 in a given year. The reinsurance
might be responsible for 90 percent of costs between $30,000 and
$75,000; then 85 percent for costs between $75,000 and $125,000;
and then again 90 percent of costs between $125,000 and
115. See Chollet, supra note 109, at 1; Swartz, supra note 110, at W380.
116. Chollet, supra note 109, at 1.
117. See Jost, supra note 105, at 427; Chollet, supra note 109, at 1.
118. Swartz, supra note 110, at W381.
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$200,000, before finally assuming 100 percent of the costs above
$200,000.119
The initial coverage is treated as coverage for a low-risk
person-as the responsibility of the carrier. When a
member crosses a threshold to become a high-cost member,
the state takes over primary responsibility for cost, but the
carrier continues to be responsible for providing coverage
and coordinating the care of the member as required under
the insurance contract's terms. To ensure that the carrier
does so efficiently, it remains responsible for a portion of
the cost (10-15% of the total in the example above) to
remain vigilant over expenditures, until the member
reaches a very high threshold.
New York's version of reinsurance for small group and
individual insurance is called Healthy New York. It was
established in 2001, and already has established itself-it
had 67,000 active enrollees as of August 2004, and was
enrolling about 5500 new members per month. 120 It is open
to small employers who have a significant number of low-
income workers, and to individuals with family incomes
below 250% of the federal poverty level. 121 Barriers to
participation are intended to prevent the crowding out of
unsubsidized insurance coverage; for example, enrollees
must have been uninsured the previous year.122
New York's level of reinsurance is somewhat less
generous than the example given above-it provides 90% of
the costs between $5000 and $75,000 for any calendar
year. 123 Even at that level, however, it is estimated that
Healthy New York will finance about 13.5% of costs for
insureds in the program, and more significantly, reduce the
need for carriers to build risk premiums into their rates.124
119. Id.
120. Chollet, supra note 109, at 5.
121. Id. at 4.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 5.
124. Id. at 5. It is interesting to note insurers' response to changes in the
reinsurance design. Prior to 2003, the reinsurance corridor was between
$30,000 and $100,000. In 2003, it was changed to $5,000 to $75,000. Insurers
reduced their premiums by approximately 17% in 2003, largely in response to
the change in reinsurance design.
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Healthy New York demonstrates that it is possible to
design a reinsurance program that makes a modest,
although not inconsequential, dent in the problems of
insuring people in the small group and individual markets.
The next Part returns to the discussion of systemic
reform, the stake the uninsured and safety net providers
have in systemic reform, and the relationship between the
goal of systemic reform and the incremental strategies of
consumer-driven health care and government reinsurance
of private health coverage. It considers the weaknesses of
both incremental strategies as they stand alone, and
proposes a method for drawing aspects of both into a
synthetic reform proposal.
III. SYNTHESIS FOR A "NEW BALANCE."
The above discussions suggest the following points.
First, health coverage promotes regular access to necessary
care; the absence of health coverage is closely associated
with impaired health status and the likelihood of death at
an early age. Universal coverage for necessary health care
is therefore a public policy goal of significant moral import.
Second, the lack of universal coverage and the proliferation
of market-based "reform" measures have placed strains on
safety net providers, as they remain the provider of last
resort for the uninsured but face diminishing opportunities
for funding. Third, recent history suggests that the
movement to universal health coverage in the United
States is a difficult one, and that consideration of the
particular political and social concerns that have stymied
past reform efforts is important. In particular, as both
Professor Jost and the Institute of Medicine counsel, a
pragmatic implementation strategy should accompany
pursuit of the fundamental goal of universal coverage.
This Part first briefly reviews the barriers to
implementation of universal coverage and the clear political
preference for incremental steps toward addressing the
problem of un-insurance. It then examines the weaknesses
of the two incremental reforms described above: consumer-
driven health care and government reinsurance of private
coverage. Finally, it suggests a synthesis of these two
incremental reforms as a platform for broader reform. This
synthesis takes from the theory of consumer-driven health
care the breaking apart of insurance coverage into its
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constituent parts: one covering routine care and treatment
of non-catastrophic illness, and another portion covering
catastrophic coverage of high-cost treatment for expensive
acute and chronic conditions. It applies this insight to the
limited success achieved by state governments in providing
reinsurance for the small group and individual markets,
allowing private insurers to cover routine costs and design
provider networks, leaving government the task of
spreading catastrophic costs more broadly.
A. The Limits to the Separate Pieces
The failure of repeated efforts to produce a politically
viable program of universal coverage can be
discouraging. 125 Much of the current resistance to new
initiatives originates in financial concerns; budgets are bad
at all levels of government, and America's anti-tax period
continues. 126 New ideas are essential; they might not be
right, and they might not work, but new ideas are needed to
breathe new life into the debate. The costs are real, and
there is no question that extending coverage to the 45
million uninsured Americans will require new spending at
the federal level. The Institute of Medicine's Committee on
the Consequences of Un-insurance estimated the cost the
new medical services universal coverage would bring:
125. See Richard F. Southby, Where Do We Go From Here: Is There Any
Hope For Real Health Care Reform?, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 442, 442 (2004).
Should one be optimistic about rational reforms for our health
care system in 2004 and beyond? Given the state of the U.S.
economy, and a depressing world situation characterized by
unending and escalating conflicts, there is little to be
optimistic about in regard to health care. Resources, financial
and human, which could be directed to improving the human
situation generally will instead, for the foreseeable future, go
to the unanticipated additional expenditures related to
international terrorism. Consequently, there is not much hope
for the 44 million Americans who do not have health
insurance, the millions of people throughout the world who not
only lack access to even modest health care but face the
onslaught of HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other
infectious diseases with few or no resources.
Id.
126. See James J. Mongan & Thomas H. Lee, Do We Really Want Broad
Access to Health Care?, 352 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1260, 1260-61 (2005); Southby,
supra note 125, at 442-43.
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[T]he costs of the additional health care that would be provided to
the uninsured once they become insured will be on the order of $34
to $69 billion a year . . . .This amounts to a 2.8 to 5.6 percent
increase in spending for personal health services for 2001. It is
equivalent to between one-third and two-thirds of the 8.7 percent
growth in national expenditures for personal health services
between 2000 and 2001.127
The cost is large but not prohibitive, and is arguably
offset to a large degree by the social savings realized by
reducing the personal, family, community and societal costs
created by the absence of insurance. 128 I will say nothing
more about the funding issue, and lay it aside at this point.
What, then, should be done? Judith Feder and Mark Pauly
have recently argued in separate articles that what has
scuttled previous proposals has been the interference such
proposals would work on existing insurance programs-
programs with which people are at least moderately
satisfied. Feder argues,
Recent debates about coverage expansions have consistently
drawn attention to the fiscal "crowd-out" effect - the degree to
which the newly available, publicly financed coverage will replace
privately financed coverage currently in effect. But a review of the
nation's policies and politics indicates that from a political
perspective, the problem is exactly the opposite. It is the
attachment to existing private coverage that "crowds out" the
political potential for proposals that would truly expand coverage
to the uninsured. 129
Pauly makes a similar argument. He suggests that
most Americans favor some form of expansion that would
provide coverage to the uninsured. They favor, however,
many different methods for addressing un-insurance, and
many people's favored plan conflicts with others' favored
plans. Further, "for each group, the next best alternative to
its preferred solution is to do nothing, and no single group
constitutes a majority."'130
127. HIDDEN COSTS, supra note 16, at 104 (citation omitted).
128. Id. at 105-19.
129. Judith Feder, Crowd-out and the Politics of Health Reform, 32 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 461, 464 (2004).
130. Mark V. Pauly, Conflict and Compromise Over Tradeoffs in Universal
Health Insurance Plans, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 465, 465 (2004). Pauly credits
2005] 567
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Professor Jost recommends flexibility in constructing a
program for achieving universal coverage. 13 1 The Institute
of Medicine's Committee on the Consequences of Un-
insurance recommends pragmatism in melding public and
private, mandatory and optional strategies for reaching
universal coverage. 132 Professor Feder counsels sensitivity
to the comfort many people feel in their current health
finance state. 133 And Professor Pauly suggests that progress
can be made if public program supports bend to allow for
public financing of a variety of plans (some private), and if
market advocates were to agree to methods of controlling
administrative costs in private plans and to the use of
public, as well as private, insurance as vehicles for
expansion. 134 This simple summary takes great liberties
with quite subtle arguments. What is clear from past
setbacks, however, is that efforts to expand coverage must,
at least for the foreseeable future, hew a path between
universal plans that install coverage for all while sweeping
away many existing institutions, and incremental plans
that tinker at the edges of the existing system but leave the
structure of private insurance unchanged. The former goal
feels unreachable across a chasm of special interests, risk
aversion, distrust of government, and tight budgets. The
latter is simply not enough. In the face of diminishing
private coverage, small-scale adjustments are shifting deck
chairs on the Titanic.
Consumer-driven health care, as I have argued at
length elsewhere, 135 takes our notions of health insurance
apart in an interesting way-separating the catastrophic
coverage from more routine and preventive coverage.
However, the implementation of consumer-driven health
care then focuses on the wrong disaggregated aspect when
addressing cost control-the initial expenditures of the
many and not the extremely expensive costs of the few very
sick.' 36 Seventy percent of health costs each year go to the
Stuart Altman for originating this insight.
131. See supra text accompanying notes 62-64, 67-70.
132. See supra text accompanying notes 65-67, 71-75.
133. See supra text accompanying note 130.
134. See Pauly, supra note 130, at 467-69.
135. See Jacobi, supra note 76 (manuscript at 39-51).
136. See id. (manuscript at 79-80).
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sickest ten percent of the population, and forty percent go to
the sickest two percent. 137 The disaggregation of the health
insurance structure may be helpful; the focus on the
marginal spending of the well fails to address the greatest
opportunity for economies, and avoids the truly critical
social concerns of assuring appropriate care for those most
in need-those with serious chronic illness. 138
B. Synthesis - A Pragmatic Melding of CDHC and
Government Reinsurance
This section attempts to suggest a strategy for
addressing un-insurance that pays heed to the wisdom
discussed in the previous section. It attempts to borrow
insights and structures from consumer-driven health care
and from government reinsurance programs. It attempts to
do so in a way that can be extended to the entire
population, that is respectful of the interests of people to
maintain connections, where possible, with their private
coverage, that attempts to contain administrative costs, and
that might work.
The core model of consumer-driven health care, which
combines a personal spending account with high-deductible
insurance,1 39 highlights an important aspect of health
insurance. Modern health insurance is really two things.
First, it is protection from catastrophic expenses incurred
when a person suffers an expensive acute or chronic spell of
illness. Second, it is payment for more modest, and more
predictable costs of preventive care and relatively routine
care. All agree that first set of costs is the proper subject of
insurance. Advocates of consumer-driven care argue that
the second set of costs is not the proper subject of
insurance; 140 for the reasons described above, that
argument is contestable.' 4' But coverage for catastrophic
losses and more routine expenditures are sufficiently
137. See id. (manuscript at 65-66).
138. See id. (manuscript at 72-79).
139. See supra text accompanying notes 83-104.
140. See JOHN C. GOODMAN & GERALD L. MUSGRAGE, PATIENT POWER:
SOLVING AMERICA'S HEALTH CARE CRIsIS 232-43 (1992).
141. See supra text accompanying notes 135-37.
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different to permit them to be treated quite differently by
the health finance system.
Government reinsurance programs have been little
more than a curiosity, given their size and the extent to
which states guard against the possibility of crowding out
unsubsidized insurance, and programs catering to
individuals and groups priced out of the traditional
insurance market are vulnerable to adverse selection
concerns. 142 But reinsurance has several very attractive
attributes. First, it permits employers and individuals to
choose and maintain their own insurance. Second, it serves
double-duty by both subsidizing the cost of coverage and
moderating (at least for small group and individual
coverage) the effect of the risk premium-thereby cutting a
dead-weight loss from the system. 143 Third, it permits
variation in richness to add or subtract government subsidy
as appropriate through the modification of the attachment
levels for reinsurance.144
A program that places government frankly and broadly
in the role of reinsurer for private health insurance
synthesizes the most valuable aspects of CDHC and
programs like Healthy New York. -The program, operated
either as a federal or joint state/federal venture, could
operate as a reinsurer of all small group and individual
coverage 145 or all private coverage. The program could
provide coverage of high-cost claims as described above.
This move would add substantial government support for
health coverage without increasing government's role as
primary insurer. It would leave intact the existing
infrastructure of both the employment-based insurance
market and the individual insurance market, and even
accommodate experimentation with new consumer-driven
health care models. The virtues of this program would be
several.
142. See Chollet, supra note 109, at 4-5.
143. See supra text accompanying notes 107-13, 117-19.
144. See supra text accompanying notes 119-24.
145. These are the areas in which reinsurance has been used by states, in
large part because most employees of large firms are insured. See Chollet, supra
note 109 and Swartz, supra note 110.
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1. A comprehensive reinsurance program moderates
adverse selection concerns. One of the concerns with more
modest reinsurance programs 146 (and with many small-
scale attempts to intervene in small group and individual
insurance markets 147) is that the reform efforts will lead to
a skewing of the market. Adverse selection arises when an
insurance product is attractive to high-risk consumers,
leading to an unexpectedly expensive risk pool. In the
reinsurance context, the concern is that "[i]f the primary
insurance program attracts an unusual volume of high-cost
groups or individuals, the cost of reinsurance, and,
therefore, the cost of the whole insurance package, will be
higher."'148  If the reinsurance program, however, is
available to all insurers in the market, for all of their
business, then the risk of a distorting effect arising from
adverse selection is reduced or eliminated.
2. A comprehensive reinsurance program reduces the
risk of the crowding out of existing insurance. Crowd-out of
existing insurance arises when a new government program
or a new subsidy provided in a targeted way leads people to
drop purely private coverage to gain the advantages
attendant on membership in the new program. 149 Crowd-
out can occur in reinsurance programs when a small
segment of the market gains the price advantage of
reinsurance.1 50 Again, however, providing reinsurance to all
the participants in the market reduces or eliminates the
possibility of crowd out.
3. Reinsurance programs leave current coverage
arrangements intact, and may staunch the flow out of
employer-sponsored coverage. The employment-based
private insurance system, so long the core of American
146. See Chollet, supra note 109, at 4.
147. See Susan Marquis & Stephen Long, Effects of "Second Generation"
Small Group Health Insurance Market Reforms, 38 INQUIRY 365 (2001).
148. Chollet, supra note 109, at 4.
149. See Linda J. Blumberg et al., Did the Medicaid Expansions for
Children Displace Private Insurance? An Analysis Using the SIPP, 19 J. HEALTH
ECON. 33 (2000); Laura Shore-Sheppard et al., Medicaid and Crowding Out of
Private Insurance: A Re-Examination Using Firm Level Data, 19 J. HEALTH
ECON. 61 (2000).
150. Chollet, supra note 109, at 4.
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health coverage, is shrinking. Continuing health care
inflation strains employers' ability to maintain coverage,
particularly in small workplaces employing low and
moderate income workers. 151 Incremental reform programs
based on the creation of new public insurance programs
directed at low and moderate income workers face the
problem of "crowd out." Crowd-out occurs in this context
when employers marginally able to provide coverage to
their employees drop that coverage in favor of their
employees' enrolling in the new government program. The
new public insurance program thereby experiences larger
than projected costs as it is accessed not only by those who
were previously uninsured, but also by some portion of the
previously-insured population. 152
In an attempt to respond to the deterioration of the
employment-based insurance system, then, incremental
reforms may accelerate that deterioration, and lead to an
increase in the cost of such reform programs.
To a certain extent, any publicly funded response to the
deterioration and increasingly apparent inadequacies of the
private insurance market will suffer from the crowd-out
phenomenon. Reinsurance programs can, however, if
thoughtfully constructed, minimize this risk. First, if
reinsurance is offered to all private plans, the government
subsidy is comprehensively spread and no hot pockets of
public subsidy will exist to drain the marginally insured
from their current coverage. Second, even if a program were
more targeted-e.g., to only small group and individual
coverage, or to such coverage when the members are below
a threshold income level153-the targeting could minimize
crowd-out. For example, if all individual and small group
coverage were eligible for a public reinsurance program,
then current insurance would benefit as well as new plans,
and members would likely stay put, enjoying the benefits of
the subsidy in the context of their existing coverage.
151. See Glied & Borzi, supra note 2, at 406.
152. Jack Hadley & John Holohan, Covering the Uninsured: How Much
Would It Cost?, W3-250, W3-262 (June 4, 2003), at
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprintfhlth aff.w3.250vl; John V. Jacobi,
Medicaid Expansion, Crowd-Out, and Limits of Incremental Reform, 45 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 79, 93-94 (2001).
153. See Chollet, supra note 109, at 2-5 (describing various eligibility rules
for state reinsurance plans).
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4. The subsidy applied to reinsurance programs could
be metered, allowing a gradual increase in public funding
as budgets allowed. The logic of health reform through
government reinsurance holds for all forms of private
insurance. Large employers, like small employers and
individuals, are facing the problems arising from inflation
in health costs. Offering government reinsurance to all
privately groups and individuals would stabilize and
subsidize our private insurance system, and perhaps serve
as a recognition that some health costs-perhaps the
catastrophic costs of care for those with serious acute or
chronic conditions-are social responsibilities. But the
subsidy could be applied in steps, as budgets permitted. The
progression might be from small, targeted programs like
Healthy New York, to the care of all persons below a set
income level, to all small group and individual coverage, to
all insured coverage, to all insured and self-funded private
coverage. In this way, the subsidy could be rolled out
without substantial risk of crowd-out, at a pace consistent
with the ability of government to absorb its share of the
cost.
5. Reinsurance programs could facilitate the
development of disease management programs.
Reinsurance programs are designed to share the burden of
high-cost cases between government and private insurers. A
substantial percentage of the high-cost cases are chronic
cases or acute cases requiring coordinated care over a
substantial period of time. 154 It has long been recognized
that coordination of care in such cases benefits both the
patient and the funder of services. 155 Truly coordinated and
effective disease management programs, however, have
been slow in coming. Giving government a direct stake in
the cases in which disease management may allow for more
coordination of research in this area; the residual stake of
private insurers may permit a wide range of
experimentation while such programs develop.
154. See supra text accompanying notes 109-25.
155. Thomas Bodenheimer, Disease Management: Promises and Pitfalls, 340
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1202, 1202 (1999).
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C. Concerns: Efficiency and Safety Net Providers
The benefit of government's acceptance of the obligation
to cover much of the catastrophic costs of the most
expensive privately insured people is substantial. The
reform must be acknowledged to be yet another incremental
reform, although one that could easily (if not inexpensively)
be applied to all privately insured Americans. Two major
concerns should be noted here.
1. The reform would lock in much of the excess costs of
private insurance. The reinsurance program described
above would build government responsibility for coverage
on a system of private insurance. The virtue of this move is
that it avoids the dislocations that arguably doomed prior,
more intrusive attempts to expand access to health
coverage. 156 The vice is that it builds upon a flawed
structure-a private insurance system that adds
substantial costs for marketing, administration, and profits,
particularly in the small group and individual markets. 157
The reinsurance proposal therefore builds in significant
inefficiencies that divert health care funding from patient
care. It may be that this cost is necessary and appropriate,
at least in the short term. It is clear that there is significant
support for a continuing substantial role for private
insurance companies in the American health coverage
system. It is even clearer that these private insurers have
substantial political power, and that any reform that does
not leave them substantially intact will face stiff political
opposition. 158 A reinsurance-based reform does not sweep
away most of the costs inherent in the fragmented private
system, particularly those for small group and individual
coverage. Instead, it removes the incentive for insurers to
add a high "risk premium" to their costs, 1 59 and provides a
mechanism for government to assume responsibility for
that aspect of coverage most naturally falling into the
category of social obligation.
156. See generally Feder, supra note 58.
157. See supra text accompanying notes 105-07.
158. See SKOCPOL, supra note 59.
159. See supra text accompanying notes 115-19.
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2. Exposure of safety net providers. Incremental
reforms have been a mixed blessing for safety net providers,
as is described above. 160 The synthesis of consumer-driven
care and government reinsurance programs builds
incrementally on the private insurance system by
consigning to government much of the cost of catastrophic
care for insured persons. As is also described above, the
reinsurance reform could be and should be coupled with an
expansion of public programs to expand public coverage to
those not uninsured. 161 But reforms in the past have been
pursued piecemeal, and if the reinsurance of private
coverage is pursued without a substantial effort to provide
coverage to those now uninsured, safety net hospitals could
remain in the position of responsibility for providing care to
the residual population of uninsured persons, perhaps with
less public funding to support their efforts.
CONCLUSION
Reform efforts are more pressing than ever. Rates of
coverage, particularly in the private sector are dropping,
and recent studies make it crystal clear that losing health
coverage has dramatic consequences for the life, health, and
financial well-being of Americans. Unfortunately, universal
reform efforts are politically and socially infeasible, while
incremental reforms seem ineffective at staunching the flow
of coverage from the private sector. A possible solution is to
borrow from the consumer driven health care movement
and the programs of reinsurance operating in small-scale
efforts in several states. Under this synthesis, government
would undertake to reinsure private coverage-that is,
assume responsibility for much of the cost of the sickest of
the private members of private plans. In this way,
government could take substantial responsibility for the
catastrophic aspect of health coverage in the private sector,
leaving to private experimentation, bargaining, and private
arrangements the means by which employers cover the
costs of non-catastrophic care. In this way, government
could assume a portion of private insurance costs-that
aspect of the costs most clearly implicating social duties of
160. See supra text accompanying notes 51-53.
161. See supra text accompanying notes 145-53.
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care and coverage-while leaving to private arrangements
less intense aspects of coverage. That coverage left to
private arrangements would involve routine physician and
occasional hospital care for the vast majority of Americans
who are not high utilizers of care, and who have a
significant attachment to the networks and arrangements
for care present in their current private insurance. The
catastrophic coverage, on the other hand, involves the bulk
of health costs, but only a few very sick persons. For that
care, the public-private partnership that will arise from the
reinsurance arrangements will allow for intense,
coordinated attention to using appropriate disease
management programs and other means to provide care to
those who need it most.
This proposal attempts to walk the path between
politically blocked universal care reforms and ineffective
incremental reforms. It will help to shore up the private
insurance system to which so many Americans are so
attached by sharing between private sponsors and
government the costs of the most expensive cases, thereby
reducing the number of uninsured. This proposal holds out
hope to low and moderate income workers who are most at
risk of losing their coverage. Left out, however, are those
unattached to the private insurance system-the
unemployed without sufficient income to purchase (even
subsidized) individual coverage, undocumented aliens, and
other marginalized groups. These groups must be addressed
by expansions in public systems such as Medicaid in order
to knit together a more seamless blanket of coverage. This
public program expansion may be more palatable if pursued
in conjunction with the shoring up of the private system in
a way that will discourage the crowd-out effects previously
attending expansions of public programs. If this public
program expansion does not accompany the implementation
of a reinsurance program, safety net providers will be
imperiled by shrinking budgets and unrelieved need for
care from those without alternatives.
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